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" ‘One of these days d’you think you’ll be able to see things at the 
end of the telephone?’ Peggy said, getting up." She will not return 
to her wondering again, in the remaining pages of Virginia 
Woolf’s The Years (1937). Distracted by a technology that invites 
practical employment more readily than critical reflection, Peggy 
half-perceives that new communication and information 
technologies are transforming society profoundly and irrevocably, 
but she cannot yet make sense of such a significant change in 
human history, at this early stage of development. The information 
society has its scientific roots in the thirties Alan Turing 
introduced the basic idea of a computational machine in 1936 
but it became a reality only thanks to the enormous military 
funding available during WWII and the Cold War. Its development 
acquired its momentum in the seventies, when PCs started to be 
sold like ordinary commodities, but it finally became a 
macroscopic phenomenon only at the end of the eighties, when the 
Internet and then the World Wide Web transformed computers 
into terminals. This explains why philosophers have just recently 
begun to address the new intellectual challenges that arise from the 
infosphere, the digital environment in which millions of people 
spend their time nowadays. The result of their investigations has 
been the emergence of a new and vitally important area of 
research. There is no label for it yet, so we may well call it the 
philosophy of information. 
Computer Ethics (CE) can be introduced as a branch of the 
philosophy of information. Digital Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT) affect not only our conceptualisation of the 
world but also human practices, thus raising ethical issues that are 
often, if not uncontroversially, thought to be new and unique. They 
concern, for example, property, privacy, responsibility, ownership, 
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the distribution of power, fundamental liberties and moral 
responsibility. And they challenge some of the basic organising 
concepts of moral and political philosophy. CE studies these 
distinctive ethical issues. Its goal is to identify and clarify problems, 
and hence formulate answers to questions about the morality of 
ICT-based actions, as well as the ethical underpinnings of public 
policies in the Information Society. 
During the last two decades, CE has consistently adopted a 
bottom-up procedure, carrying out an extended and intensive 
analysis of individual cases, amounting very often to real-world 
issues. Its aim has been to reach decisions based on principled 
choices and defensible ethical principles, and hence to provide 
more generalised conclusions in terms of conceptual evaluations, 
moral insights, normative guidelines, professional codes, 
educational programs or legal advice which might apply to whole 
classes of comparable cases. 
Despite such extensive evidence and analysis, it is still commonly 
held that CE-problems may work as counterexamples, show the 
limits or stretch the conceptual resources of already available 
macroethics that is theoretical, field-independent, applicable ethics, 
like Consequentialism or Deontologism, but can never give rise to 
a substantially new ethical perspective. According to this 
deflationary approach, there is no special category of computer 
ethics, but just ordinary ethical situations in which computers and 
digital technology are involved, and therefore CE is at most a 
microethics, that is a practical, field-dependent, applied and 
professional ethics. Understood as a decision-making and action-
oriented theory, CE appears only as a technical subject, which can 
hardly add anything to already well-developed ethical theories. 
Behind CE’s foundationalist problem there lies a lack of a strong 
theoretical programme. ICT, by transforming in a profound way 
the context in which some old ethical issues arise, not only adds 
interesting new dimensions to old problems, but seems to invite us 
to rethink, methodologically, the very grounds on which some of 
our ethical positions are based. 
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The six invited essays collected in this special issue of Etica & 
Politica all address the problem of the conceptual basis of CE and 
its philosophical relevance to the ethical discourse, though in 
different ways and with different goals. The first two essays, by 
Deborah G. Johnson and Walter Maner, articulate a negative and a 
positive answer to the question whether problems in CE can be 
considered unique and therefore may require the development of a 
"new ethics". James Moor’s essay, by focusing on the concept of 
justice, represents a valuable bridge between this foundationalist 
issue and the study of specific issues in CE, which are provided by 
Helen Nissenbaum (trust) and Jeroen van den Hoven (cyber-
democracy). The last article, by Floridi and Saunders, returns to 
the foundationalist issue and further elaborates an Information 
Ethics understood as a macroethics. 
What may be worth emphasising, before inviting the reader to 
evaluate the different positions, is that all authors agree on the fact 
that CE does have something distinctive and substantial to say on 
moral problems. Whether it can only contribute an interesting 
perspective to the ethical discourse, or it actually leads to 
development of a new position that cannot be merely brought 
under other standard ethical theories is still matter of lively debate 
and further research. It is my hope, however, that this special issue 
of Etica & Politica will contribute to clarify the problems further. 
